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ABSTRACT
Potter (1975, 1976) has shown that visual masks can
exert effects both at the level of the icon and at higher
levels of processing.

Her methodology involved presenting

pictures in a sequence at very fast rates, in order to
mimic naturalistic saccadic viewing.

The present study

used a similar methodology in order to investigate whether
a picture which violates an expectation about pictures
in that series exerts more of a masking effect than a
picture which coincides with the expectation.
Each of 38 subjects was shown 36 sequences of eight
pictures.

In nine trials, every picture in the trial was

drawn from the same category.

In 27 of the trials, seven

pictures were from the same category, and one picture
(the mask) was from a different category.

The mask

appeared in nine trials in the fourth position of the
serial presentation, in nine trials in the fifth position,
and in nine trials in the sixth position.

Before each

trial, the category of the majority of the pictures was
announced.

After each trial, subjects were given a

forced-choice recognition task.

Recognition of pictures

presented in the series adjacent to non-conceptually
related items was compared to recognition for items adjacent
to conceptually related items.
vii

Mask items tended to be remembered more frequently
than conceptually related items located in the same
serial position.

In four of six comparisons, items

adjacent to masks were recognized less frequently than
control items.

In one of six comparisons, items were

remembered more frequently.
Thus, in a quickly presented series of conceptually
related pictures, a non-conceptually related mask exerts
more of a masking effect on adjacent items than does a
conceptually related item.

In some mask positions,

however, this finding was not obtained.
tions for the discrepancy are discussed.

viii

Possible explana

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Mary C. Potter (1976) in examining the characteristics
of memory for -visual material, found that when pictures
were presented very quickly in sequence subjects could more
frequently "detect" a given target picture while the
sequence was being shown than they could later in a
recognition task.

In two experiments, sequences of 16 color

photographs were presented at rates of 113, 167, 250, or 333
msec per picture.

A particular target was specified in

advance for one group of subjects and their task was to
"detect" that target while the sequence of pictures was
being shown.

The other group of subjects was given an

immediate test of recognition memory for the pictures after
the sequence had been run, and had no target specified in
advance.

The results of these experiments were that even

when the target had only been specified by a title (e.g.,
boat) detection of a target was strikingly superior to later
recognition memory.

In a third experiment, it was found

that when pictures were presented singly for about 120 msec
and then followed by a visual stimulus (a "mask") consisting
of irregular shapes of paper pasted onto a background,
recognition memory was as accurate as detection had been.
On the basis of these findings, Potter argued that, on
average, a scene is understood and becomes immune to visual
1
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masking within about 100 msec.

Thus immune, it has time to

consolidate and be remembered later.

However, as experiments

one and two suggest, pictures require about 300 msec of
further processing before the memory representation becomes
immune to masking from a following picture.
The purpose guiding this study was to extend Potter’s
research on visual masking as it relates to the character
istics of the mask, and the consolidation conditions needed
to make a picture resistant to forgetting.

Of special

interest here is whether conceptual relatedness between a
mask and a target makes any difference in the target's
consolidation.

A growing body of research indicates that

conceptual relationships, even within the first moments of
viewing time, play a role in various aspects of picture
processing.

The research presented here extends the investi

gation of conceptual relationships into the area of visual
masking.

In particular, the study addresses whether in a

procedure used to mimic real world viewing conditions,
conceptual relatedness between a visual mask and a preceding
and following target affect later recall of the targets.
Several areas of research in visual perception are
pertinent here.

First, the area of visual masking provides

the general background against which to study the effects
of one visual stimulus on the perception of another.
Second, an area of research indicating the importance of
global processing suggests the importance, in viewing a
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picture, of relationships between discrete elements of
that picture.

Some of these relationships which influence

masking (for example, the probability that one object
would be seen in the vicinity of another object) are
related to conceptual factors.

Finally, research leading

to the postulation of schemas and the related notion of
"frames" is pertinent because it provides a conceptualization
for hypothesizing how and why conceptual relatedness might
affect masking.
Masking— An Historical Overview
The phenonenon known as masking occurs when two
stimuli are presented closely in time and the processing
of one of those stimuli (the target) is reduced by the
occurrence of the other stimulus (the mask).

Research on

masking can be described along a number of parameters.

It

can be defined in terms of time; backward masking occurs
when the mask follows the target and forward masking occurs
when the mask precedes the target.

It can also be defined

in terms of type of mask— whether, for example, the mask
is a burst of light, or a pattern of lines.

And when the

mask is a pattern which does not spatially overlap with
the target, the cases of backward and forward masking are
known as metacontrast and paracontrast respectively.

Thus

the literature on masking is massive and complex and only
that relating to the present study will be summarized here.
The initial studies on visual masking involved
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relatively simple stimuli.

Potter’s (1976) work, described

above, represents remarkable sophistication over early
research in this area, in terms of methodology, stimulus
complexity, and implications for higher order processing.
A large corpus of work on visual masking by light (see
reviews by Kahneman, 1969; Norman, 1965; and Raab, 1963)
can be traced back as far as the 'forties (e.g., see
Crawford, 1947).

The procedure used in many of these

studies involved a target stimulus which was a brief flash
of light illuminating a small circular patch, and a masking
stimulus which was a more intense flash, illuminating a
larger area.

Typically (see Kahneman, 1969) when the

target stimulus preceded the masking stimulus by less than
50-100 msec, the threshold for its detection rose steeply,
a form of backward masking known in this context as the
Crawford effect.
More typical of later research in the 'sixties and
early 'seventies was Averbach and Coriell's study (1961)
which instead of investigating the masking parameters of
light, examined the effects of masking using more complex
stimuli.

Subjects were briefly shown two rows of letters.

Soon after letter offset a ring appeared where the letter
had been.

Subjects failed to see the letter, indicating

that backward masking had taken place.

Following Averbach

and Coriell's work, a multitude of experiments were
performed examining the effects on masking of such
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parameters as the time interval between mask and. target
(e.g., Schiller, 1965b), the relative intensities of the
stimulus (e.g., Schiller and Smith, 1966) and size of the
target arrays (e.g., Weisstein, 1966).

The area was

enthusiastically researched because it held important
implications on the formulation of the "icon", the brief,
veridical, sensory store, where such masking was presumed
to be taking place.
Though the existence of visual masking is indisputable,
the explanation for why it occurs is still argued.

The

major problem any explanation of masking must address is
how two stimuli which do not overlap in time can interact.
In backward masking, for example, a stimulus which follows
another stimulus affects the perception of the earlier
stimulus.

A later event seems to be affecting an earlier

one, and this appears illogical.

The visual system, hence,

must be regarded not only as a spatial one, but a temporal
one as well.

It must take time beyond the actual presenta

tion period of a stimulus for that stimulus to be fully
processed.
There have been two kinds of theory which account for
masking and both share the idea that the visual response
to a brief stimulus lasts much longer than the stimulus
which caused it, and that consequently the two responses
to the stimuli overlap in time.

The two types of theories

are (1) interruption theories and (2) summation theories
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(Kahneman, 1968).

The interruption theory argues that the

consolidation of the target stimulus is interrupted somehow
by the masking stimulus, while the summation theory contends
that the target and masking stimulus are visually super
imposed, much like a photographic double exposure.
Both interruption and summation theories have been
well represented in the literature.

Crawford (1947) posited

an explanation which seems an early, if primitive, example
of interruption theory.

He viewed the masking effect as

due to a difference in travel time to the brain of the two
stimuli, with the more intense pulse arriving more quickly
than the weaker pulse.

If one views the nerve transmission

of visual impulses as the biological metaphor for visual
information processing, it is clear that the processing of
stimuli was being interrupted by later stimuli.

Though

Crawford’s explanation has been refuted by Boynton (1961)
and others (Battersby and Wagman, 1959*

Schiller, 1968),

a more sophisticated neural model, which also relies on the
notion of interruption, has been presented by Breitmeyer
and Ganz (1976).

These authors postulate two processing

channels in the visual system:
"transient system".

a "sustained system" and a

The sustained system is said to be

operative when one fixates a stimulus, and processes
information of a high spatial resolution.

When a change in

stimulus occurs, the transient system is activated; the
transient system is involved in signalling the location,
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or change in location of a stimulus.

Masking occurs

because the transient system inhibits the sustained system
whenever a new stimulus is perceived.
Sperling (1963) has also described an interruption
theory of visual noise masking.

He argues that until the

arrival of the masking stimulus, the central representation
of a target stimulus would be available for processing or
information extraction.

He based his conclusion on an

experiment in which he found that for every 10 msec that a
backward mask, consisting of visual noise ("noise" refers
to random dark on light configurations) was delayed beyond
the onset of a test stimulus, consisting of an array of
letters, the perceiver could report one more letter.
Sperling reasoned that the visual noise was controlling the
time that the test stimulus was available for processing,
but not the adequecy of the test stimulus itself.
The summation theory is in contrast to the view that
masking does not degrade the adequecy of the representation
of the test stimulus.

For example, Kinsbourne and Warrington

(1962) argue that the neural response to visual noise
summates with that from the test stimulus, degrading the
primary visual representation by overloading the system.
The system is less capable of conveying information about
the testing stimulus not because the perceiver has less
time to process it, but because the quality of the visual
representation is poor.

Thus, both summation theories and
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interruption theories take into account temporal factors
in visual information processing.

Whatever theoretical

position one takes, however, evidence shows that only when
tachistoscopically presented stimuli are separated hy at
least 100 msec will the events be registered as separate
(Mayzner, Tresselt, Heifer, 1967; Kahneman and Wolman,
1968; Turvey, 1973).
Masking At Higher Levels Than The Icon
The term "masking" has usually been applied to the
phenomenon as it occurs on the "icon", the visual sensory
register which holds veridical information for no longer
than a second or so at most (Sperling, I960).

The research

on masking was instrumental in the delineation of the
icon’s characteristics, such as retreival of information
from this store (Sperling, I960), the immediacy of the
formation of the icon after the stimulus presentation
(Spencer, 1969), and whether the icon is a peripheral or
central process (Schiller, 1966).

However, the notion of

masking— of a stimulus interfering with a temporally close
one— need not be limited to the icon.

One of the major

assumptions of the information processing approach is that
processing of stimuli takes time— whatever the level of
analysis.

Below, in the discussion of Potter's (1969,

1975, 1976) work, we see that items presented closely in
time must be interacting at a higher level than the icon.
Potter and Levy (1969) used a technique suggested by
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Averbach and Coriell (1961) in which viewers briefly
glimpsed pictures presented in a sequence at rates of up
to eight per second.

They proposed that this technique

mimicked normal saccadic vision.

(Saccades are the eye

movements involved in visual information processing, usually
occurring about every third of a second).

The authors

argued that pictures presented rapidly in this way are
processed one by one for precisely the time each is in
view.

Analysis and storage continue only up until the next

substantial visual change.

An event will be remembered

if it has been '’consolidated1’ before the next substantial
visual change occurs.

Otherwise, processing will be

interrupted, and the subsequent recognition of the picture
will be lowered.

Of interest is the fact that interference

of consolidation occurred beyond the time that is associated
with the icon.

For example, pictures presented for 2

seconds were recognized later at a higher frequency than
pictures presented for 1 second.
But even within the time span of approximately one
second which has been associated with iconic storage
(Sperling, I960), masking at a higher order has been shown
to occur.

Potter (1975) had viewers briefly glimpse pictures

presented in a sequence at rates up to eight per second
(125 msec each).

Subjects were asked to look for a target

in the sequence, and respond as soon as they saw it.
Subjects were supplied with either a verbal description of
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the target, or actually shown the target prior to the
trial.

Even at the fastest rates of presentation, subjects

could "detect" complex pictures 70% of the time.

However,

few pictures presented sequentially at these speeds were
recognized (by another group of subjects) in a subsequent
memory task.

It follows from the results that (l) if

subjects could match a verbal label of the target with the
target itself, then processing beyond the level of the
icon, which is only a sensory store, was occurring.

It

also follows that (2) something akin to masking was taking
place, since the immediate detection memory for an item
was higher than the subsequent recognition memory for
items.

At quick rates of presentation, therefore, process

ing proceeded to a point where matching could take place,
but the item was nonetheless prevented from consolidating
in memory.

It was also found that subjects recognized a

target picture as accurately and almost as rapidly when
they knew only its meaning given by a name as when they had
seen it.

The level of processing was such that a name

description was about coequal to a visual description,
even at speeds of 125 msec.

The implication is not, of

course, that the icon does not exist; rather, it seems that
even with iconic storage, a picture can be quickly abstracted
to a high level of meaning, but will be forgotten ('or
"masked") unless there is an uninterrupted period of
further consolidation.
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In an extension of this work, Potter (1976) suggested
that there is a short term conceptual memory for an image;
it occurs during a period after identification, during
which the memory trace is highly vulnerable to interference.
The nature of the interfering stimulus, however, is allimportant.

On the basis of tachistoscopic presentation of

pictures, Potter argued that, on average, a scene is under
stood and so becomes immune to ordinary visual masking
within about 100 msec (by "ordinary" masking, she refers
to masking by visual noise) but requires about 300 msec of
further processing before the memory representation is
resistent to masking from a following stimulus.

Again,

here is evidence that masking is occurring at a level in
the processing hierarchy where a random noise mask, and a
mask consisting of a picture do not exert an identical
effect.
Under ordinary conditions, consolidation of pictures,
and their subsequent recognition, is excellent.

For example,

Shephard (1967) found that recognition for 600 pictures
presented one at a time was 98% when the recognition task
involved selecting the target picture from a single distractor.
The high performance drops off drastically when the presenta
tion time for each picture is reduced from several seconds
to the brief intervals researchers such as Potter (1975,
1976) have used.

The longer the picture is presented the

more likely it is to be remembered (Lutz and Sheirer, 1974;
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Weaver and Stanny, 1978).

Though the effect of stimulus

duration seems both empirically and intuitively obvious,
a related question has a less self-evident answer.

The

question is "How much consolidation in memory can take
place when the stimulus is removed from view", and was
addressed by Intraub (1980).

Using a procedure similar

to Potter's, she found that pictures shown in sequence
for 110 msec each with an interstimulus interval (ISI) of
5890 msec were later recognized almost as well as pictures
shown for the full six seconds.

Thus, in the absence of

masking, processing for a removed picture still proceeds.
The period of processing extends beyond the icon, she
argues, though it is still susceptible to masking by a
picture but not a noise mask.
Intraub offers further evidence that, under certain
conditions, masking occurs at a high level of processing.
She found that filling a 5 sec ISI with a to-be-ignored
picture which was the same on all trials had little or no
masking effect on the briefly presented picture.

This

indicates that the characteristics of an effective mask may
be even more specific than had been expected.

Not only is

visual stimulation alone not always sufficient to mask an
image, but even another picture, if it is not novel or
otherwise important to the subject, may not have the
characteristics sufficient to interfere with the consolidation
in memory of a target.

Just any picture will not always
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be effective as a mask.

What, then, are the character

istics of the visual mask which produce different degrees
of masking?

One possibility to be explored in this

research is that conceptual relatedness between the mask
and the target affect consolidation in memory.

The term

"conceptual relatedness" is meant to refer to similarity
in category between two items.

For example, both a bus

and a car belong to the category of motor vehicles and
are, in the present terminology, "conceptually related".
Global Processing in Picture Viewing
Recently there has been increased recognition that
global features of a visual array play a significant role
in perception.

That perception is not merely a matter of

gathering discrete bits of data about particular objects
in the environment has been a view which has existed from
very early psychological theories of perception.

However,

the notion has been given different emphasis, and has taken
a different form in recent years.

A brief discussion of

the influence of this idea to modern psychology is presented
below.
The belief in the wholeness of perception was a
fundamental characteristic of the Gestalt movement (Kohler,
1929).

This influential school of psychology emphasized

that we tend to see particular patterns in visual configura
tions, rather than perceiving a composite of component parts.
Though Gestalt psychology eventually waned in influence,
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students of perception, no matter what particular orienta
tion they ascribed to, have not been able to ignore the
inevitable existence of differential perception of
stimuli as a function of other stimuli in the configuration.
For example, the notion that "context" plays an important
role in perception has been incorporated into the information
processing models of Bruner (1957), Morton (1969), Neisser
(1967), Norman (1963) and Wickelgren (1979).
Picture viewing, as well, has shown context effects.
Palmer (1975) established for subjects the context for an
object by showing a visual scene.

Then the subject was

briefly shown a picture of a target object that was either
appropriate (a toaster was shown after a kitchen scene has
been presented) or inappropriate for the scene.

There were

two types of inappropriate objects— those that looked like
possible appropriate objects (a mailbox looking like a
toaster) and those that bore no resemblance to potentially
plausible objects in that given scene.

The task was to

name the object and rate the confidence of the response.
Objects were correctly identified about twice as often when
the preceding context was appropriate than when it was
inappropriate.

Correct responses and confusions with

visually similar objects depended strongly on both the
contextual condition and the particular target object
presented.

In addition, some objects were presented with
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no preceding context.

Without this context, performance

was less accurate than that for either an appropriate or
inappropriate object following some context.
Palmer’s exploration of context effects in an entire
scene is reflective of a trend, within the last 10 years
or so, of evaluating the perception of complex inter-related
stimuli, rather than the perception of isolated stimuli.
Many researchers have become disenchanted with research
which examines only the perception of simple stimuli.

Some

tachistoscopic research, for example, has been criticized
for this reason; the detractors claim that the visual
configuration presented to the subject is too artificial.
Normal viewing, they argue, does not involve perception of
simple split-second images, but rather involves exploration
of the complex visual world in which we normally find
ourselves.

Neisser (1976) comments upon the contrived

nature of such tachistoscopically presented images:
Such displays are very close to not existing
at all.

They last only for a fragment of a

second, and lack all temporal coherence with
what preceded or what will follow them.

They

lack any spatial link with their surroundings,
being physically as well as temporally dis
connected from the rest of the world.

(pp. 35-36)
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The trend toward the study of more complex stimuli
is exemplified by Biederman's work (1972, 1981) which has
explored how the inter-relationships of stimuli composing
entire scenes affects processing.

His examination of

the importance of global processing— the processing of
holistic information about a scene— has further extended
the notion of context.

Whereas early researchers viewed

context in relatively simple terms (for example the
presence of an item adjacent to a target item) Biederman
(1981) has described how context is an important factor
in highly complex scenes.

He describes two kinds of

relationships among objects in a contextually coherent
scene.

Syntactic relationships take into account more

physical aspects of a scene; for example, the fact that
objects usually rest atop other objects or surfaces and the
fact that objects usually are not transparent.

Semantic

relationships involve a referential meaning component; for
example, semantic constraints involve the probability that
an object will occur in a given scene, the probability that
an object will appear in certain locations, and the fact
that objects have certain size relationships.

A brief

review of Biederman's work, which suggests the importance
for processing of syntactic and semantic relationships, is
presented below.
Biederman (1972) had subjects view real world scenes
presented for durations of 300, 500, or 700 msec.

He also
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manipulated, the variable of "jumbling".

Jumbled scenes

were scenes that were cut into segments, put back together
in a jumbled way, and presented to subjects.

Biederman

compared accuracy of cued object identification in
coherent and jumbled scenes, and found that jumbling
reduced accuracy.

This indicates that processing of a

component stimulus is dependent upon the coherence of the
entire scene, indicating the importance of semantic and
syntactic constraints.
In another study, Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass and
Stacy (1974) replicated the earlier work of Biederman
(1972), this time using exposure durations of 20, 50, 100
and 300 msec, intervals shorter than the average fixation.
Even at these very high speeds jumbling reduced the
accuracy of identification of cued objects in a scene,
suggesting that very early in viewing, incoherence of the
scene reduces the ability of subjects to recognize objects.
In this study, Biederman et al. also examined the effects
of jumbling upon the ability of subjects to label a briefly
presented scene.

Subjects were given a choice of labels

to choose from.

It was found that their ability to label

a scene was reduced more by jumbling when the choice labels
were similar (i.e., where particular objects would be of
less informational value) than when they were very
dissimilar.

This indicated that holistic information is

of value in discriminating among labels.

Hence, two kinds
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of information were posited as being derived from a single
fixation on a scene— holistic information and information
about particular objects.
Navon (1977) has provided more evidence of the
importance of global characteristics in picture viewing.
He argued that acquisition of global information takes
precedence over the acquisition of local information in
viewing a picture— in other words, that we see the "forest
before the trees".

Navon had subjects view patterns in

which global configurations were formed of smaller stimuli
which were identical to the global configurations.

For

example, a large letter "H" was constructed of little "H"s,
or a large letter "S" was formed from many smaller "S"s.
At the same time Navon constructed stimuli analogous to
the Stroop color-word test:

a large "H", for example, was

constructed of little "S"s, or a large letter "S" was formed
from many smaller "H"s.

Subjects were asked to identify

either the local or global pattern of such stimuli.

Whereas

the identity of the small characters (local information)
had no effect on recognition of the large characters (global
information), global cues which conflicted with the local
ones did inhibit the response to the local level.

Hence,

Navon argued that the perception of the whole is precedent
to the perception of the parts.

Others, however, have taken

issue with Navon's study (Kinchla and Wolfe, 1979;
Pomerantz and Sager, 1977).

Kinchla and Wolfe (1979), for
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example, found that by altering the size of the visual
configuration, local elements could interfere with the
perception of global elements.

Neither global nor local

elements were found, under all circumstances, to be
precedent over the other.

However, though research in

this area has garnered valuable data, the question of
whether global or local information enjoys precedence may
be an overly simplistic argument.

Perceivers undoubtedly

gain and use information about both early in viewing.
Other evidence that global information is gathered
early in viewing comes from eye movement studies.

Eye

movements, these studies show, are not random, but reflect
systematic and directed behavior which can give insight
about what sort of information is being attended to at any
given point in the viewing process.

In one of the earliest

of such experiments, Buswell (1935) found two basic patterns
of eye movements as viewing of complex scenes occurred.
He found (l) a general survey in which the eyes moved in
short pauses over the picture and (2) longer eye fixations
in a more concentrated area usually appearing after the
survey scan.

Buswell also found that the length of the

average fixation increased as subjects proceeded to view
the picture, suggesting that as viewing progressed, more
time was spent processing the detail of the picture.
Mackworth and Morandi (1967) provided more direct evidence
that early in the viewing process the entire picture seems
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to "be "sized up" by the perceiver.

They found that the

location and density of eye fixations of subjects was
directly related to ratings of informativeness of
particular portions of the picture given by a different
group of raters.

Mackworth and Morandi suggested that

informative areas are fixated as effectively during the
first 2 seconds as they are during the last 2 seconds,
indicating that vision is guided early to the informative
parts of a picture, and hence that information about large
parts of the scene are obtained during the early moments
of the viewing process.
Antes (1974) further examined the time course of
picture viewing.

The eye movements of a group of subjects

were recorded as they viewed each of ten pictures for 20
seconds.

The pictures had been divided into meaningful

sections and subjectively rated for their informativeness.
Antes found a pattern of eye movements more complex than
had earlier been recorded.

The density and duration of

fixations, as well as the extent of the saccades, were not
consistent throughout the viewing period.

Mean informative

ness of locations fixated decreased over time, reaching an
asymptote at about 10 sec.

Mean duration of fixations

showed a steady increase and mean extent of saccadic eye
movements showed a steady decrease as viewing time progressed.
Descriptively, the pattern was as follows:

subjects

originally made many long saccades to fixate informative
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elements for short amounts of time.

This behavior

gradually evolved to fixating informative features less
frequently, with longer examination of less informative
areas.

Again, Antes' (1974) data provides evidence that

an awareness of the entire picture (at least to the
extent of a subject's being able to locate and fixate
on informative areas) occurs early in the viewing process.
The findings concerning the acquisition of global
information early in viewing have implications for the
choice of methodology employed to study the processing of
pictures in sequence.

In Potter's (1975, 1976) studies,

for example, there was no consistent global information
in the sequence presented, and thus the sequences may have
been highly artificial and unlike real world viewing.

When

subjects are unable to extract global information— when,
for example, early expectations about the content of the
picture sequence are violated by the presence of items not
normally seen in the presence of other items, processing
may be altered.

As described above, Biederman (1974) found

that even at exposure durations quicker than those used by
Potter (1975, 1976) and Intraub (1981), a jumbled picture
affected later recall of cued items within that picture.
Thus, even at the very short intervals used in the method
of presenting pictures sequentially, the jumble of images
of non-related pictures which falls on the retina must
have an impact on processing.

To make a serial presentation
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of pictures more naturalistic, two things are advisable.
First, the pictures should possess some contextual coherence
with each other.

Second, at the beginning of the sequence,

the viewer should be provided with information about the
"gist" of the pictures to be shown.

Such information

would hopefully correspond to the early information
extracted by perceivers in real world scenes.

Otherwise,

the lack of consistent global information in a picture
sequence— the violation, for example, of early expectations
about the content of pictures by the presence of pictures
not normally seen in the presence of the other pictures—
may cause processing of the scene to be altered.
Schemas and Frames
Another area of work is also relevent to the proposed
experiment— that of "schemas" and "frames".
the work of Friedman (1979) is germane here.

In particular,
Friedman

argues that when an optic array is viewed, a "frame",
consisting of a cognitive embodiment of one's expectations
and anticipations about a scene is invoked, or "instantiated".
The frame guides viewing:

specifically, items consistent

with the instantiated frame will be processed rapidly,
while incongruous or unexpected items not consistent with
the frame will take longer to process and require more
processing resources.

Presuming that, in a sequential

presentation of pictures, there was provided both contextual
coherence between pictures and early information about the
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gist of such pictures to subjects, there would be, follow
ing from the work of Friedman, an alteration of processing
characteristics later evinced by poorer memory for those
items which immediately preceded or followed an unexpected
item in that sequence.

If the subject expects a certain

type of picture, the inclusion of an incongruous item may
require additional processing resources.

The item may

thus draw resources away from the processing of neighboring
items, thus effectively masking them.
Since the notion of frames is so important to the
formulation of the experiment to be proposed, a history
of the different conceptualizations which led up to this
idea will be traced here.

The notion of "schema" a fore

runner of the notion of "frames" gained widespread
familiarity with Bartlett's (1932) publication of Remembering,
and became a handy concept to describe the perception of
information at a molar level.

A number of authors have

used the idea of schemas to account for effects attributable
to semantic relations— or their violations (Biederman,
1972; Bruner, 1957; Miller, Gallanter and Pribram, I960;
Minsky, 1975; Neisser, 1976).

Across authors, a schema is

generally meant to imply an organization of past reactions
or experiences which serve to guide perception and (in
Piagetian theory) action.
Theorizing about schemas has undergone some evolution
over the years (Penland, 1979).

As Penland describes,
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Bartlett emphasized the behavioral aspects of schemas
proposing them as organizers of past action rather than
past impressions.

However, he also argued that "orienta

tion" was one of the primary functions of schemas.
Orientation implied that personal interests, values, and
needs were involved in perception.

Perceivers alter new

input so that it is congruent with their schemas.

For

example, in a classic study, Sir Bartlett read a Kwakiutl
Indian folktale to a group of British (experimental)
subjects, and then asked them to recall the story.

Knowing

little about Indian customs and beliefs, the Britons altered
the story and omitted details so that it conformed to their
own culture and become more sensible to them.

As time

passed between the telling and the retelling, the story
became more altered.

The mental framework into which new

facts and ideas were incorporated modified the input,
changing it into a more meaningful entity.
Piaget's (1954) notion of schema has, along with
Bartlett's, been enormously influential.

His idea of the

interaction of assimilation and accommodation underlies
many of the present formulations of schema.

Assimilation

is the function by which experienced knowledge of the world
is incorporated into preexisting knowledge structures.
Accommodation is the process by which existing knowledge
structures are modified in accordance with novel events.
Closely related to the idea of schema is that of

25

frames.

Friedman (1979) argues that when viewing a scene,

expectations about that particular scene "instantiate"
or evoke a frame.

These expectations may be derived

from early glimpses of the scene or from experimentally
induced primes such as thematic descriptions, or category
or object names.

When the object of perception is expected

(when it it is part of the frame) processing is guided by
these anticipations--processing is "top down".

Encoding of

expected objects requires only feature "detection", a
procedure requiring relatively few processing resources.
On the other hand, when an object is unexpected with respect
to the frame, "bottom up" analysis of the visual stimulus
must occur.

"Analysis" requires more processing resources

than "detection".
What precisely determines which particular frame is
instantiated?

According to Friedman, a particular frame is

instantiated by "obligatory" objects— objects closely
related to the theme or meaning of a scene.

For example,

a refrigerator, because of the perceiver's past experience,
would be an obligatory object in a kitchen scene, and
would serve to instantiate the appropriate frame.

After

all, a kitchen is more or less "obliged" to have a
refrigerator.
To test her theory, Friedman hypothesized that,
because unexpected objects are "analyzed" rather than
"detected", the degree of detail available to an observer
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will be greater for objects that are unexpected than are
expected.

She presented subjects with six complex line

drawings, the themes of which were announced before
presentation.

Eye movements were recorded while subjects

scanned each scene.

The duration of the first eye fixation

on an object was a function of the a-priori likelihood
that the fixated object would be present in the particular
scene.

This suggests that when a person expects an

object to appear in a scene, relatively short first fixa
tions occur on these objects.

"Detection", which requires

relatively less information than "analysis", is involved.
In addition, Friedman found that subjects were more likely
to notice transformations or alterations of unexpected
objects than expected objects.

In her view, this occurs

because in the course of bottom-up processing (processing
in which expectencies do not play a role) more details
about an object are encoded.
Present Experiment
A quick summary of the research presented here reveals
the problm which the present study addresses.

The basic

area which underlies the present study is that of visual
masking.

Research indicates that, on average, a scene is

understood and becomes immune to visual masking from a
following stimulus composed of odd shapes within about 100
msec.

However, the scene requires additional time to

become immune to masking from a following picture (Potter,
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1975).

Additionally, Intraub (1980) found that a

to-be-ignored picture will exert less of a masking
influence, under some conditions, than a picture which
is novel.

This research indicates that characteristics

of the mask, which can only be discriminated at a high
cognitive level (higher than the icon) have differential
effects on the extent of masking.
The methodology which Potter and Intraub used
consisted of presenting in series pictures for brief
periods of time.

The picture had no contextual relation

ship between them.

In view of research which indicates

the importance of contextual relationships for viewing
(Biederman, 1972; Biederman et al., 1974) their methodology
was not conducive to a viewing situation generalizable to
real world viewing.
In the present study, a modification of Potter's
(1975, 1976) and Intraub's (1980) method of serial presenta
tion was employed to test whether objects are more prone
to masking by items which are conceptually related.

Pictures

from a particular category (e.g., animals) were presented
serially.

Thus semantic relations normally seen in the

real world were mimicked.
Subjects were informed verbally before the presentation
of the sequence about the category of objects to be viewed.
A non-gist item (the mask) was presented in some of the
series, in predetermined serial positions.

In effect,
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every item was masking every other item in the series
and the particular effect of the non-gist item was
measured against a control condition where the correspond
ing position was occupied by a conceptually related item.
The prediction was that the resources needed to process
the non-gist mask would detract from resources available
to the processing of adjacent items.

This follows from

Friedman's (1979) work, in which more processing resources
are required for an unexpected item— in this case the
mask.

A non-gist item will therefore exert more of a

masking effect than a conceptually related item.

Thus,

those pictures presented adjacent to the mask would be
recognized less accurately than pictures in the equivalent
position in the control condition.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY
Design
The problem under investigation required that an
incongruous item (the mask) he embedded at a particular
place in a sequence of otherwise conceptually related
pictures.

The position of the mask was not in the same

place on all trials.

The subsequent recognition of that

mask, along with items adjacent to that mask, was compared
against that of items in equivalent positions in a control
condition:

that is, a sequence in which all items were

conceptually related, with no masks.

Besides the control

trials, there were three other groups of trials, with each
group consisting of trials composed of eight line drawings.
In the first group, all items were conceptually related
except for the fourth item, which was randomly chosen from
an entirely different class of objects.

In the second

group of trials, all items were conceptually related except
for the fifth item, and in the third group of trials, all
items were conceptually related except for the sixth item.
For the sake of word economy, these three groups will be
referred to as Mask Four, Mask Five, and Mask Six.
Each of 58 subjects received nine trials each of the
control, Mask Four, Mask Five, and Mask Six conditions.
The trials of all groups were randomly mixed, and presented
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daring a single experimental session.

Accuracy of picture

recognition was measured in a forced-choice recognition
test, in which subjects attempted to recognize all items
in the previously presented sequence.

Mean accuracy for

items adjacent to the mask in each of the experimental
groups was compared to items in equivalent serial positions
in the control group with six a-priori t_-tests.
Subjects
The subjects were 38 University of North Dakota
students participating in the experiment for credit for
various undergraduate courses during the summer and regular
fall semester.

Participation was limited to those students

reporting normal vision with or without correction.

The

data from one student was excluded because she reported
after the experiment that she had not been wearing glasses
and could barely see the images.
Stimuli
Test pictures.

The approximately 250 line drawings

used as stimuli were obtained from Snodgras

and Vanderwart's

(1980) compilation of line drawing stimuli.

The stimulus

pictures are unstylized depictions of objects and animals
drawn with black lines, and given some minimal shading.
The authors standardized the stimuli on four variables:
name agreement, image agreement, familiarity, and visual
complexity.

The authors also grouped all pictures into

various subcategories (e.g., animals, vehicles, clothing,
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etc.) and each item was, in addition, rated as to the
degree it exemplified a category.

For example, though a

spoon might well exemplify the category "kitchen utensils",
a broom would poorly exemplify that same category, and
thus receive a lower rating.
In the present study, items from Snodgras and
Vanderwort's compilation which were very poor exemplars
were eliminated, though this involved a somewhat subjective
and arbitrary decision about what rating would comprise
the cut off point between an adequate and inadequate
exemplar.

Also eliminated were items v/hich were visually

confusable with other items in the same group. - For
example, the drawing of a thumb and of a finger (in the
category "body parts") were almost indestinguishable in
design, even upon close examination.

Several categories

were entirely eliminated when they consisted of many items
which were poor exemplars, or when they consisted largely
of items which appeared in other categories.

Finally,

several categories were omitted because they were not
constituted of a sufficient number of exemplars.

A requisite

15 items were needed in any category since a trial consisted
of 7 items in the experimental conditions (8 in the control)
and 7 more items from the same group were needed as
distractors for the forced choice recognition task.

In

one case, a new category ("flying things") was composed of
items from three unused categories ("insects", "birds",
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"toys").

See Appendix A for a list of categories and

exemplars.

A final change was the renaming of the

category "four footed animals" to "animals".

This was

done to increase the number of good exemplars in this
category.
The stimuli were arranged into 43 trials (36 experi
mental trials plus seven practice trials), with each trial
having eight drawings.

The 36 trials were divided so that

there were nine in each of the mask positions, and nine
in the control condition.

The large number of pictures

ensured that no single picture would appear in a critical
position— either as a mask or adjacent to a mask— more than
twice.
Sequences of pictures were photographed one frame at
a time with a Beaulieu camera on 16 mm Kodachrome film.
Each picture occupied three frames on the film, so that
when the film was run at 16 fps (standard silent speed)
on an ordinary projector, each stimulus appeared on the
screen for 188 msec.

Though stimuli varied somewhat in

size, each occupied about 36 square inches on the screen
at maximum.
Response items.

On the slide from which the subjects

made a forced choice recognition, there were 16 items.
All the items which appeared in the sequence, plus seven
additional items from the announced category, plus a
non-conceptually related item were randomly arranged on the
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slide.

The slide containing the table of alternatives

was presented on the same screen onto which the sequence
of pictures had been projected.

A number underneath each

response alternative was used by the subject when
responding.

Instead of recording the name of the object

which he had seen, the subject merely recorded the number
underneath.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the experimenting room, subjects were
seated about 10 feet from the screen, in a semicircle of
seats.

Size of each group tested averaged about five

subjects and ranged from four to seven.
Both written and oral instructions were given.

The

verbal instructions paraphrased the written instructions
which were printed along the top of the answer sheet (see
Appendix B for a sample answer sheet).

It was explained

that (l) the subjects would see a very rapid presentation
of pictures (2) these pictures would be mostly from one
category group (3) subjects would be told at the beginning
of the trial which category to expect (4) they should pick
from the table of alternatives what objects they remembered
seeing and (5) if they could not remember eight pictures,
they should guess, so they recorded a total of eight.
They were also told that their choices did not have to be
listed in the order they remembered seeing them.

Subjects

were given seven practice trials, and then experimental
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trials were run.

The entire procedure, including practice

trials and debriefing, lasted about 50 minutes.
Trials were presented in random order so that no
trials from a particular mask position were clustered
together more than three times in a row.
received the same random order of trials.

\

All subjects

CHAPTER III

RESULTS
Each subject yielded nine responses on the recognition
task for each serial position for each of the trial
groups.

The mean number of correct recognitions by

subject for each serial position in each group of trials
is shown in Table 1.
in this table.

Standard deviations are also listed

Means show a range of 4.3 to 7.8 for con

ceptually related items, 5.1 to 7.4 for masks and 4.7 to
5.6 for items adjacent to masks.

There was a possible

range of zero to nine, with 4.5 corresponding to chance
responding.

Scores for all positions in the control group,

Mask Pour, Mask Five, and Mask Six are graphed in Figure 1.
Target Items
In order to test for the effects of conceptual masking,
six a-priori comparisons were made between means for items
adjacent to masks, and items in the corresponding position .
in the control group.

One tailed tests were used.

Four of six a-priori comparisons reached significance
(see Table 2).

Thus, in four of six cases, items adjacent

to the mask were recognized more poorly than items in the
same serial position in the control group.

Two item

positions (items adjacent to a mask in the fifth position)
which did not reach significance in the desired direction
tended to be recognized with greater accuracy than
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TABLE 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Serial
Positions Across Experimental Trials
Serial Positions
1
Control

Mask 4

Mask 5

Mask 6

2

3

4

5

6

8

7

5.16

5.34

5.34

4.82

5.84

5.11

5.84

7.76

(1.4)

(1.38)

(1.49)

(1.47)

(1.46)

(1.52)

(1.27)

(1.45)

5.10

5.13

4.66*

5.11

5.13*

5.00

5.53

7.60

(1.6)

(1.39)

(1.46)

0-72)

(1.65)

(1.55)

(1.36)

(1.18)

4.54

5.60

5.26

5.55*

6.26

5.55*

5.08

6.63

(1.58)

(1.43)

(1.54)

(1.31)

(1.63)

(1.43)

(1.42)

(1.34)

5.45

5.39

5.45

4.42

4.90*

7.42

4.79*

7.21

(1.33)

(2.21)

(1.62)

(1.5)

(1.47)

0-16)

(1.16)

(1.26)

Note. Standard deviations are in parenthesis, mask items are underlined, and
critical items are marked with an asterisk.
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TABLE 2
Comparisons of Items Adjacent to
Masks with Control Items
Serial Position
3
Mask 4

2.093**

Mask 5

5

6

-1.2851
2.982***

at
at
at
at

7

1.8437*
-2.275

Mask 6

*
sig.
** sig.
*** sig.
****sig.

4

.05 level for one tailed test
.025 level for one tailed test
.005 level for one tailed test
.00005 level for one tailed test

4.1399****
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Figure 1

Means for Serial Positions
across Experimental Trials

o---- ---- •
A ------ ---- A

Control
Mask in Position 4

A-

Mask in Position 5
Mask in Position 6

-A
o---- ---- O
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corresponding control items.
Because the recognition accuracy for the critical
items in Mask Five was discordant not only with the
experimental prediction hut with the findings from Mask
Four and Mask Six, further analysis of these items was
undertaken.

It was questioned whether particularities of

those items in the fourth and sixth position may have
elevated their recognition frequency.

It is possible

that visual properties of the pictures might have made
them easier to remember.

In order to examine this possi

bility, the recognition accuracy of these pictures was
examined when these same pictures appeared in other trial
groups (control, Mask Four, Mask Six), and in other serial
positions, excluding those serial positions which
constituted a mask position, a position next to a mask,
or the last position in a sequence of pictures.

It was

found that, when they appeared elsewhere, those pictures
in position four in Mask Five were recognized 60.5% of
the time.

When presented elsewhere, those in position six

in Mask Five were recognized 63.2% of the time.

When the

pictures were presented in positions adjacent to the mask
in the fifth position, they were recognized 61% of the
time in both cases.

It seems therefore that peculiarities

of the pictures used did not much influence the high
(relative to prediction) rate of recognition for these
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pictures.

It should he noted that this preceding analysis

is merely suggestive.

Some of the pictures which

appeared in the fourth and sixth position in Mask Five
did not appear elsewhere in the experiment, and could
not be figured in the computation.
Mask Items
In addition to the six a-priori tests comparing items
adjacent to masks and corresponding items in the control
condition, accuracy scores on mask recognition were
analyzed to determine if additional processing occurred
with the masks.

The assumption is that if masks were

recognized at higher rates then there is evidence of
increased use of resources during mask processing.

The

results were that when the mask was in the sixth position,
recognition was significantly elevated over control,
t(37) = 8.0127, p <

.0005.

Raw scores indicate that masks

in the fifth position were recognized with greater
frequency than conceptually related items, and this
increased recognition approached significance, t(37) =
1.506, p . .1.

The t value for masks in position five

may have reached significance if not for the unusually
high frequency of recognition for this serial position in
the control group, which reduced the potential t value.
In the fourth position, the mask was recognized with
greater frequency than the control, but the difference
did not reach statistical significance.

It seems, there
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fore, that there is at least some evidence that processing
for masks, at least when they are in the fifth and sixth
positions in a series of eight, demands more resources
than items which are not conceptually different from other
items in the series.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION
The present experiment attempted to explore whether
conceptual factors influenced visual masking.

Masking

was described as the inhibitory effect on processing
by a stimulus (the mask) on another stimulus which closely
precedes or follows it.

Masking was also said to be

operative both at the level of the sensory register (the
icon) and at higher levels of processing.

Since a growing

body of research indicates that conceptual relationships,
even within the first moments of viewing time, play a role
in picture processing, it was hypothesized that conceptual
relationships would influence the potency of a mask
embedded in a serial presentation of pictures.

Given the

importance of global information in picture viewing, it
was predicted that if subjects were made to expect to see
a series of pictures of an announced category, the presence
of an incongruous item would disrupt processing in much
the same way that the presence of an incongruous item in
a scene influences processing.

In the research design

of the present experiment, global information was
incorporated into the relatively artificial methodology
of Potter (1975, 1976) and Intraub (1980) by informing
the subjects at the beginning of the trial as to the
category of objects they should expect to see.
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Thus, in
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the present experiment, a person derived an anticipation
of the conceptual category of objects he was about to see,
was then shown a series of the objects, into which was
introduced a non-conceptually related item.

The question

was whether the items immediately preceding or following
this item would be recalled less accurately than items
in the equivalent position in a control group with no
mask.
It was predicted that masks would be remembered with
greater accuracy than equivalent control items, and that
items adjacent to masks would be remembered less frequently
than control items in equivalent positions.

The reasoning

behind this lies with Friedman’s (1979) notion of frames.
According to Friedman, a verbalization can evoke a frame,
an organization about anticipated objects in a scene,
based on previous experience.

An object which violates

the expectation— in the present situation the mask— requires
additional processing resources, making it more recognizable
subsequently.

At the same time, the unexpected object

in the series would deprive adjacent items of processing
resources, thus diminishing later recognition of these
objects.
Effects on Masks
The prediction that the masks would be remembered
more accurately than control items was partially upheld.
These findings provide some support for the hypothesis
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that increased resource allocation needed for "analysis"
rather than "detection" will cause the item in question
to be recognized later with greater accuracy.

However,

greater memory for masks could also be explained in terms
of "stimulus isolation" or what has come to be called
the Von Restorff effect.

In a classic study, Von Restorff

(1933) found positive effects on recall for an item in a
series that had been made perceptually distinct (see
Hilgard and Bower, 1966, for discussion).

This experiment

and later experiments (Von Restorff and Kohler, 1935)
demonstrated the effect of isolating the stimuli either
physically or cognitively.

It was found that if one item

in a visually presented list of nonsense syllables was
painted red, or printed differently, or if the item were
a number rather than a nonsense syllable, the memory for
the item was enhanced.

Other support for the increased

memory for stimuli isolated in a cognitive dimension is
given by Kimble and Dufort (1955) who presented trials
of 15 highly meaningful words to subjects, with a low
meaningful word at the seventh position.

Relative to

control, the low meaningful words were remembered with
fewer errors.

The logic invoked by the authors to explain

the results are somewhat opposite that described in the
Introduction.

Kimble and Dufort argue that meaningful

words tend to cause multiple, competing associations that
interfere with the overt emission of the correct response.
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However, it has been argued in the Introduction that the
mask requires more rather than less processing than other
items because it has to be ’’analyzed”.

Presumably, the

generation of multiple associations would require
additional processing resources, and this is where the
two explanations differ.

However, Kimble and Dufort’s

explanation is less defensible if we take it to its logical
extreme, which is that low meaningful lists would be
remembered more accurately than high meaningful lists.
An explanation in terms of frame theory would posit low
meaningful lists as more difficult to remember, since
there would be few associations between items, and there
fore more of a need for analysis, which depletes resources.
Kimble and Dufort have not, of course, provided the
only explanation of the Von Restorff effect.

Other

explanations, for example Green’s (195 5) ’’surprise”
hypothesis emphasize considerations of attention which
give it certain similarities with frame theory.

Thus, it

is not necessary to invoke Friedman’s theory to explain
better memory for masks in the present experiment.

Other

explanations might be made, but they all perhaps could
be reduced to Friedman's notion of frames, and her
concomittant ideas of data analysis and detection.
Items Adjacent to Masks
The prediction that items immediately preceding or
following masks would be recognized less frequently received

46

partial support.

In view of the partial evidence of

increased memory for the masks, indicating extra
resources had been used for the processing of these
incongruous items, it is suggested that the items
adjacent to the mask were deprived of resources needed for
consolidation in memory.

But though four of six a-priori

comparisons were in accord with the original prediction,
two comparisons were in accord with the original prediction,
two comparisons did not show significance.

Both of these

comparisons which were not consistent with the other
four comparisons occurred when the mask was in position 5.
No completely satisfactory reason arises to explain
this discrepency.

If the mask in position five were not

"doing its job", that is, drawing away resources through
analysis, then it could be argued that adjacent items
were getting their share of resources.

But as has been

indicated, mask in position five was remembered at a rate
which approached significance.

Nor can we assume that

pictures adjacent to the mask in the fifth position had,
inherent in them, characteristics which would make them
more likely to consolidate, under masking circumstances,
than any other of Snodgras and Vanderwart*s (1980) line
drawings.

In other words, there is no reason to assume

that the pictures next to the mask in position five had
some originally higher baseline rate of recognition.
These same pictures, when occurring in other positions in
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other experimental manipulations, were recognized at about
the same frequency as they were in the experimental
condition next to the mask.

Neither does it appear that

the control values for positions four and six were
abnormally low.

In other words the high recognition rate

in position four before a mask is not due to an idio
syncratic control mean.

When measured against the fourth

item when the mask was in position six (a non-critical
item which would not be directly affected by the mask),
the fourth item in Mask Five still is recognized at a
relatively elevated level.

The same holds true for the

sixth item in Mask Five when compared to the sixth item
in Mask Four.
Another possibility is that the fourth and sixth items
in Mask Five showed increased retention precisely because
they were located next to a mask.

Rundus (1971) presented

subjects with lists of words printed in black, into which
were intruded words printed in red.

He found that the

main effect of introducing a distinctive item into a free
recall list thus appears to be (a) an increase in recall
probability for the distinctive item, (b) a decrease in
overall performance on the list, and (c) an enhancement of
items presented adjacent to the distinctive item.

Mask

Five was the only group of trials which exhibited the
enhancement of items presented adjacent to the distinctive

48

item, and the reason for this is uncertain.

It is certain,

however, that in consideration of Rundus1 findings, the
suppression of memory for adjacent items in Mask Four
and Mask Six is all the more noteworthy, since one might
have expected that memory for these critical items would
have been, if anything, enhanced.

A possible explanation

for suppression rather than enhancement in Mask Four and
Mask Six is that when an unusual item in a series is only
physically distinct— when for example it is red rather
than black— resource deprivation does not occur in the
same way as in a conceptually coherent sequence into which
a non-conceptually related item is placed.

Still, of

course, this does not explain why Mask Five produced
different data than Mask Four and Mask Six.

1

Serial Position Effects
Murdock and Walker (1969) found a serial position
effect for both visually and auditorily presented lists.
However, as shown in Figure 1, all mask conditions as
well as the control trials had a recency effect, but no
primacy effect.

A similar finding was reported by Potter

and Levy (1969) who found a strong recency effect, but a
lower than average recall for the first item in picture
sequences.
The discrepancy which seems to exist may be explained
in terms of a modality effect.

When speaking of the
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serial position effect for memory of spoken words,
Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) buffer model is often
cited.

The primacy effect is theorized to be due to the

fact that early items in the list enter an empty "buffer"
which can hold several items which are rehearsed until
pushed out of the buffer by a succeeding item.

The extra

rehearsals of the item facilitates consolidation in
memory.

However, iconic storage, as opposed to echoic

storage (the auditory sensory register), may have charac
teristics which terminate the rehearsal of initially
presented items when new ones are presented.

In echoic

storage, for example, it may be possible to retain more
than a single item, whereas in the icon this does not
occur, since each succeeding item instantly erases the
one before it (see Klatzky, 1975 for discussion).

Early

items in a visually presented list may not be rehearsed
more than later ones.

At fast rates rapid erasure may

preclude a primacy effect in the data.
The lack of a primacy effect and the presence of a
recency effect also seems to indicate that, in a series
of pictures, backward masking is more effective than
forward masking.

In the present experiment the last item

in a given sequence seems to have been little affected by
the presence of an item before it, although it is
impossible to say how much greater masking would have been
if there had been no picture at all in position seven.

50

On the other hand, items in the beginning of the list
were remembered very poorly.

Evidently they did not

much profit from the absence of a preceding item— the
lack of forward masking did not much increase recognition
accuracy.

In future experimentation, it might be useful

to determine the extent, under conditions of no masking
at all, of memory for the last item.

It might happen

that the last item would be remembered even more accurately
were there no item placed before it.

An experiment might

consist of presenting six items, then a blank space of
equivalent time, and then the target.

Such an experiment

might clarify the role of forward masking in rapidly
presented sequences of pictures.
Overall, the results of the experiment underscore
the importance of conceptual factors in a viewing situa
tion where they have not otherwise been extensively
explored, namely the viewing of lists of conceptually
related objects.

The experiment approximated real world

viewing situations by (l) instantiating a frame early in
the viewing process, (2) presenting pictures for a period
of time about the same as the period of time the eye would
normally focus on various images and (3) having subjects
view series of pictures which had some coherent theme to
them.

The study was a success to the extent that it showed

that conceptual factors influence the amount of masking
which occurs in a sequential presentation of pictures.
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Whether or not a viewed item is expected or unexpected
has implications for its own processing, and for the
processing of temporally close images.

Not only were two

out of three masks remembered with greater frequency
than would otherwise have been expected, but the items
adjacent to the masks, in four of six cases, had their
recognition accuracy significantly reduced.
The conception of the experiment, therefore, seems
sound, but needs to be further refined.

Several improve

ments might be incorporated into the methodology, should
a similar experiment ever be performed.

First, it is

vital to make sure that no serial position in any
experimental group contains a preponderance of pictures
which have visual characteristics making them either
especially recognizable, or somehow immune to masking.
A pretest of stimuli, to determine their baseline rates
of recognition by subjects when their category is known
beforehand is advisable.

By announcing the category, and

then showing the picture for an appropriately short period
of time (e.g., 188 msec), one could better insure that
experimental results are not artifacts of the stimuli
used.

It would also be helpful to see how the stimuli

are affected by forward and backward masking.

Certain

idiosyncracies of stimuli in a masking situation, which
would otherwise confound the data, might be detected.
Another improvement in the procedure which would
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make a similar experiment more -valid would be to more
fully create proper visual relationships between the
items.

Ideally, the presentation of pictures should

mimic the way images from a well formed scene fall on
the retina as natural saccadic viewing occurs.

Accord

ing to Biederman (1980), there are five attributes to a
well formed scene:

(l) support— the fact that most

objects rest on something (2) interposition— an opaque
object will occlude the contours of an object behind it
(3) probability— certain objects are likely to be seen
with other objects (4) position— objects in a given scene
are likely to be seen in some positions and unlikely to
be seen in others and (5) size— objects have certain size
relationships.

In this experiment most of these

attributes were violated.

The objects did not appear to

rest on anything, there was no positioning of objects in
a probable way (all appeared on the same place on the
screen), and objects presented were not drawn to a con
sistent scale.

Whether or not condition 2 (interposition)

was met is also questionable.

Since the objects were

presented alone, one really cannot say whether they were
opaque or not; however, the very fact that they were
presented alone is inconsistent with naturalistic viewing.
The only relationship consistent with real world viewing
was probability, and even this was sometimes not well
realized.

For example, though animals are conceptually
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related, there are very few places (except for a zoo)
where one might expect to see a horse, a hear, an alli
gator, or a giraffe.

Nor does one normally see a plane,

a locomotive, a baby carriage, or a truck together.
In the future, it might be advantageous to arrange, mix,
and alter the size of stimuli with the ultimate view of
creating more realistic viewing circumstances.
Another methodological consideration which should
be taken into account in future experimentation is that
the presence of masks in the experimental group may reduce,
to some extent, the rate of recognition for non-mask
items in the recognition phase of the task.

The mask

itself tends to be recognized with very high frequency.
Since the recognition task is one in which subjects have
to choose 8 items from a total of 16 alternatives, the
high recognition rate for any single item reduces the
probability that they will be reported as recognized.
The high frequency of mask recall may thus serve to depress
the recognition rate for other items in Mask Four, Mask
Five and Mask Six.

The same thing is not occurring in

the control condition, which may therefore have higher
recognition values for positions other than that which
corresponds to the mask condition in other trials.
Adjustments for this factor might be made by altering,
during control trials, the number of response alternatives,
or perhaps by placing a "floating" mask within the
control group.

APPENDIX A

CATEGORIES AND EXEMPLARS

CATEGORIES AND EXEMPLARS
ANIMALS:

bear, camel, cow, deer, dog, donkey, elephant,

fox, frog, giraffe, goat, gorilla, horse, kangaroo,
leopard, lion, monkey, mouse, pig, rabbit, raccoon,
rhinocerous, sheep, skunk, squirrel, tiger, turtle, zebra,
ant, caterpillar, lobster, spider, seahorse.
KITCHEN UTENSILS:

bowl, cup, fork, frying pan, glass,

kettle, knife, pot, refrigerator, rolling pin, spoon,
stove, toaster.
ARTICLES OF FURNITURE:

bed, chair, couch, desk, dresser,

lamp, record player, stool, table, television, vase,
rocking chair, clock, ashtray, piano.
HUMAN BODY PARTS:

arm, ear, eye, finger, foot, hair,

hand, heart, leg, lips, nose, thumb, toe.
FRUIT:

apple, banana, cherry, grapes, lemon, orange,

peach, pear, pineapple, strawberry, tomato, watermelon.
VEGETABLES:

artichoke, asparagus, carrot, celery, corn,

lettuce, mushroom, onion, peanut, pea, pepper, potato,
pumpkin.
CARPENTER'S TOOLS:

ax, chisel, hammer, knife, ladder,

nail, nut, pencil, pliers, ruler, saw, screwdriver, wrench.
CLOTHES:

belt, blouse, cap, coat, dress, glove, hat,

jacket, pants, shirt, shoe, skirt, sock, sweater, tie,
vest, watch.
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THINGS THAT FLY:

chicken, duck, eagle, osterich, owl,

peacock, rooster, airplane, balloon, helicopter, bee,
butterfly, fly, grasshopper, beetle.
VEHICLES:

airplane, balloon, bicycle, bus, car,

helicopter, horse, motorcycle, roller skate, sled, train,
truck, wagon, carriage, sailboat.

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE ANSWER SHEET

DIRECTIONS: Before each trial, the experimenter will
announce what most of the objects in the trial are (for
example, "dogs"). Each trial will then be presented on
the screen, at the focussing dot. After the trial is
presented, you will be shown a slide, and you should try
and remember which items on the slide were in the trial.
If you think a particular item on the slide was in the
trial, write down the number below the item on your answer
sheet. If you cannot remember what you saw on the trial,
guess, so that all 8 spaces on your answer sheet are
filled.
If you have any questions, ask. Remember, before
each trial look at the dot on the screen. This is where
the pictures will be shown. Also, remember to guess on
those items you do not remember. All spaces on your
answer sheet should be filled up.
SAMPLES
1

15

2

16

3

17

4

18

5

19

6

20

7

21
22

1

23

2

24

3

25

4

26

5

27

6

28

7

29

8

30

9

31

10

32
59
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11
12

34

13

35

14

36
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